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THE JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION:
EMBRYONIC GUIDELINES FOR THE CONSOLIDATION
OF PRETRIAL PROCEEDINGS
I. INTRODUCTION

As a result of multiplying caseloads and expanding backlogs, American
courts are currently struggling with congested calendars and delayed litigation.' However, the problem of court congestion and delay is not of recent
origin. As early as 600 years before the dawn of the Christian era, the prophet
Habacuc stated: "[T]he law is torn in pieces, and judgment cometh not to
the end ....
2 The problem was also recognized in the thirteenth century
when the drafters of the Magna Carta pledged that: "To no one will we sell,
to no one will we deny, or delay right or justice." 3 Nevertheless, two centuries
later "[d]evices for delaying, hindering, and obstructing altogether the
work of the fifteenth century Court of Common Pleas were many."4 Congestion and delay in the 16th century German courts caused Goethe to lose
his taste for the law and turn to the profession of letters.5 At the beginning
of the 17th century, Shakespeare's Hamlet, in his soliloquy,
catalogued life's
0
"troubles" and listed among them "the law's delay."
Although the problem of lagging justice is thousands of years old, its dimensions have recently reached staggering proportions. Our modern society has
created demands on our judicial establishment which amount to a "law explosion." 7 The increased workload which has engulfed the courts had already
stretched our judicial system to its limits by the mid-twentieth century.8 In
1954 the seriousness of the situation prompted Justice Jackson to declare that
1. Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, Reports of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States 169-314
(1968) [hereinafter cited as Annual Report with appropriate date). See also The Courts,
the Public, and the Law Explosion (H. Jones ed. 1965); H. Zeisel, H. Kalven, & B. Buchholz, Delay in the Court (1959) ; Kaufman, Courts in Crisis: Progress Versus Intransigence,
52 A.B.A.J. 1026 (1966); Warren, The Administration of the Courts, 51 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y
196, 197 (1968).

2. Habacuc 1:4 (Douay).
3. W. Swindler, Magna Carta: Legend and Legacy 317 (1965) (emphasis added).
4. M. Hastings, The Court of Common Pleas in Fifteenth Century England 211 (1947).
5. H. Zeisel, H. Kalven, & B. Buchholz, supra note 1, at xxiii-xxiv n.6 (1959).
6. Hamlet, act 3, scene 1. For additional literary references to the law's delay see Gray
v. Gray, 6 II. App. 2d 571, 578-79, 128 N.E.2d 602, 606 (1955).
7. The Courts, the Public, and the Law Explosion 2 (H. Jones ed. 1965). See H. James,
Crisis in the Courts vii, viii (1968).
8. See Congestion of the Docket: A Symposium, 28 Conn. B.J. 369 (1954); Jayne,
Tinkering with the Judicial Machinery, 36 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 84 (1952); Nims, Backlogs:
Justice Denied, 42 A.B.A.J. 613 (1956); Wright, The Federal Courts-a Century After
Appomattox, 52 A.B.A.J. 742, 743 (1966); Note, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 110 (1954).
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"delayed justice has become little less than scandalous ... ."'In 1958 Chief
Justice Warren, addressing the American Law Institute, stated:
I must report that the delay and the choking congestion in the federal courts today
have created a crucial problem for constitutional government in the United States. It
is so chronically prevalent that it is compromising the quantity and quality of justice
available to the individual citizen and, in so doing, it is leaving vulnerable throughout
the world the reputation of the United States for protecting and securing these rights
and remedies.
. .. The federal judiciary is simply unable [without improvements]

...

to keep

pace with the dynamic growth of our country.' 0
It is the purpose of this comment to examine the origin, nature, and application
of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation-a procedural device which
has been developed to alleviate a portion of this complex problem.
II. THE JUDIcIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTICT LITIGATION

In 1961, into a climate of mounting judicial crisis, came the "Electrical
Equipment Antitrust Cases"" in which twenty-nine manufacturers of electrical
equipment were convicted in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania of antitrust
violations.' 2 Following the criminal convictions, aggrieved purchasers began
to file civil suits for treble damages under section 4 of the Clayton AcL 13 The
number of actions eventually totalled 1,912 cases, involving 25,623 claims for
relief filed in 35 separate federal districts.' 4 Such an avalanche of litigation
threatened the federal judicial system with impending breakdown and chaos."
9. Knickerbocker Printing Corp. v. United States, 75 S. CL 212 (Jackson, Circuit Justice, 1954).
10. Warren, Delay and Congestion in the Federal Courts, 42 J. Am. Jud. Soc'y 6-7
(1958).
11. See Neal & Goldberg, The Electrical Equipment Antitrust Cases: Novel Judicial
Administration, 50 A.B.AJ. 621 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Neal & Goldberg].
12. 1962 Annual Report at 95. The defendants had been charged with conspiring to fix
prices and allocate business in violation of the Sherman Act. Neal & Goldberg at 621. See
the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964). Extensive commerce had been affected
by the price fixing. Neal & Goldberg at 621-22. Sales totaling in the billions of dollars had
been made throughout the country. Application of California, 195 F. Supp. 37, 39 (E.D.
Pa. 1961).
13. 1962 Annual Report at 95; Neal & Goldberg at 622. The Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C.
§ 15 (1964) provides that a party injured by a violation of the antitrust laws may bring
suit in a federal court for treble damages against the violator. A criminal conviction for
a violation will be prima fade evidence against the defendant in a civil action. Clayton
Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1964).
14. Hearings on S. 915 & H.R. 6111 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial
Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 322 n.l (1967)
[hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 915]. "Each of these 25,623 separate claims for relief
was a potentially protracted case." Id.
15. Id. at 322; 1962 Annual Report at 95; H.R. Rep. No. 1130, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.,
in 2 US. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1889, 1898 (1968) [hereinafter cited as H.R. Rep. No.

11301.
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However, the Judicial Conference of the United States10 had anticipated the
emergency. The Judicial Conference is a permanent organization consisting of
judges representing all of the federal jurisdictions in the United States.' 7 The
Conference conducts a continuous survey of the federal court system and advises the Supreme Court on improvements in the rules of practice and procedure
and, through the Chief Justice, recommends legislation to Congress. 18 In 1961,
before the criminal cases had been completed, the Conference foresaw the
disruptive impact such a mass of litigation would have on the courts.10 Wasteful
and time consuming duplication of effort by both the courts and the parties
during the pretrial stages was recognized as a serious problem. 20 Another problem was the possibility 2' of conflicting rulings on preliminary questions being
22
made in the different district courts.

Existing provisions for solving these pretrial problems by coordinating and
consolidating the cases were inadequate when applied in multidistrict litigation.23 The principal devices available for such action were 28 U.S.C. § 1404
(a),24 which allows a change of venue, and Rule 42(a) 25 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, which provides for the consolidation of actions. Section
1404(a) enables a district court to transfer a civil action to another distict.
Although this would make possible the consolidation of cases in multidistrict
litigation by transferring all the cases into one district,20 1404(a) has a serious
shortcoming since the section allows transfer only to a district where the case
"might have been brought."2 7 Thus, the statute bars a change of forum unless
16. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1964).
17. S. Rep. No. 1744, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., in 2 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 3023,
3024-25 (1958).
18. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1964).
19. Hearings on S. 915 at 321; 1962 Annual Report at 95; Neal & Goldberg at 623.
20. 1962 Annual Report at 95; Neal & Goldberg at 623.
21. In complex multidistrict litigation involving a large number of cases filed in many
different districts, it is not only "possible," it is "probable." In re Plumbing Fixture Cases,
298 F. Supp. 484, 492-93 (1968).
22. Neal & Goldberg at 623.
23. Id. at 622.
24. "For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district
court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have
been brought." 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1964). Section 1404(a) is based upon the supercedcd
doctrine of forum non conveniens. Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 342 (1960); Ex parte
Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 58 (1949). Cf. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
25. "When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the
court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions;
it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay." Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a).
26. In fact the Supreme Court has held that such transfers serve the purpose of the
statute. In Continental Grain Co. v. Barge FBL-585, 364 U.S. 19, 26 (1960), the Court
said that: "To permit a situation in which two cases involving precisely the same Issues
are simultaneously pending in different District Courts leads to the wastefulness of time,
energy and money that § 1404(a) was designed to prevent."
27. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1964).
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the requirements of venue and jurisdiction could have originally been satisfied
in the district to which the cases are to be transferred.28 Rule 42(a) is an
even less effective device in multidistrict litigation, since20 it allows consolidation
only of those cases already pending in the same district.
The Judicial Conference realized that these provisions would be inadequate
to meet the challenge of the electrical equipment cases. The Conference therefore created a special Coordinating Committee and directed it to explore the
problems of pretrial discovery in multidistrict litigation.30 Although it lacked
statutory authority, the Coordinating Committee obtained the consent and cooperation of all the parties and the district judges in the electrical cases and
successfully brought about coordination and consolidation of the pretrial proceedings. 31 The Committee called a series of meetings at which the judges responsible for the litigation agreed on and issued pretrial orders which were
national in scope.32 In addition, a national deposition programm and a national
document depository were established. 34 The procedural innovations employed
by the Coordinating Committee were so effective that by 1967 all of the cases
had been disposed of. 35
As a result of its success with the electrical cases, the Coordinating Committee recommended legislation to establish a formal system for consolidating
28. Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 342-44 (1960); C. Wright, Federal Courts § 44,
at 167 (1970). It should also be noted that a 1404(a) transfer is of the entire action. The
section does not allow separate transfer of only the pretrial proceedings. See Hearings on
S. 961 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm.
on the judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 233 (1969). Therefore, even if the jurisdiction and
venue requirements are met, 1404(a) is ineffective where consolidated pretrial proceedings
are desirable but consolidated trials are not. An example of such a situation would be actions based on the same underlying facts but brought on different legal theories. For a
discussion of the use of 1404(a) in multidistrict litigation see Note, The Problem of Venue
in Multiple District Litigation, 41 Notre Dame Law. 507, 508-18 (1966); Comment, The
Search for the Most Convenient Federal Forum: Three Solutions to the Problems of Multidistrict Litigation, 64 Nw. U.L. Rev. 188 (1969).
29. National Equip. Rental Ltd. v. Fowler, 287 F.2d 43, 47 (2d Cir. 1961); Silver v.
Goodman, 234 F. Supp. 415, 416 (D. Conn. 1964); 2B W. Barron & A. Holtzoff, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 941, at 178 (C. Wright ed. 1961).
30. S. Rep. No. 454, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967) [hereinafter cited as S. Rep. No.
4541. This Committee was a special subcommittee of the Judicial Conference's Committee
on Trial Practice and Technique. The Subcommittee was authorized by the Judicial Conference in September 1961, and in January 1962 Chief Justice Warren appointed its members. The Coordinating Committee consisted of nine federal judges. Id.; Hearings on S.
915 at 322.
31. 1962 Annual Report at 95.
32. 1963 Annual Report at 102.
33. Depositions were taken from more than 185 witnesses. 1964 Annual Report at 42.
34. The defendants alone produced more than 600,000 documents. 1963 Annual Report
at 102.
35. S. Rep. No. 454 at 4; H.R. Rep. No. 1130, in 2 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1898,
1899 (1968).
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pretrial proceedings.86 The legislation proposed by the Committee was enacted
as section 1407 to title 28 of the United States Code37 "to provide centralized
management under court supervision of pretrial proceedings of multidistrict
litigation to assure the 'just and efficient conduct' of such actions." 3 8 To achieve
this purpose 1407 established a Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation.
IMl. THE NATURE AND FUNCTION OF THE PANEL

The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation3 9 consists of seven federal
circuit and district judges designated by the Chief Justice of the United
States. 40 No two members may be from the same circuit.41 Any action by the
42
Panel requires the concurrence of four members.
Section 1407 provides that "[w]hen civil actions involving one or more
common questions of fact are pending in different districts", 43 the Panel may
transfer the actions to any one district "for coordinated or consolidated pretrial
proceedings." 44 The section deals only with pretrial proceedings and not the
trial itself.45 Transfer action may be initiated by a motion submitted to the
Panel by an interested party, or sua sponte by the Panel itself.40 A hearing is
36. S. Rep. No. 454 at 4; Hearings on S. 915 at 320.
37. Hearings on S. 915 at 326; H.R. Rep. No. 1130, in 2 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
1898, 1898-1900 (1968).
38. H.R. Rep. No. 1130, in 2 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1898, 1899 (1968).
39. The office of the Panel is located in Washington, D.C. Rules of Procedure of the
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation 4, 47 F.R.D. 377, 378 (1969) [hereinafter cited
as Panel R.]. However, the Panel convenes "whenever and wherever desirable or necessary." Id. Panel R. 13, 47 F.R.D. 377, 380 (1969). See, e.g., In re Texas Concrete Pipe,
302 F. Supp. 1342, 1343 (1969); In re Scotch Whiskey, 299 F. Supp. 543 (1969).
40. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(d) (Supp. IV, 1969).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (Supp. IV, 1969). 1407 is free of the venue and jurisdictional
limitations which restrict transfer under 1404(a). See notes 27 & 28 and accompanying text
supra.
44. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (Supp. IV, 1969) (emphasis added).
45. Id. This serves to preserve the privilege of the litigants to select the trial forum.
46. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(c) (Supp. IV, 1969). Transfer action is initiated by the Panel by
serving the parties with an order to "show cause" why transfer should not be made. Unless
the order provides otherwise, a party opposed to transfer has 15 days within which to file
his response and brief. Parties favoring transfer may file reply briefs. Panel R. 11, 47 F.R.D.
377, 380 (1969). A party requests transfer action by submitting to the Panel a written
motion accompanied by a brief. Opposing parties may file a brief in opposition, and the
moving party may file a brief in reply. Id. at 6, 47 F.R.D. 377, 378-79 (1969). The Panel
has ruled that "parties" as used in 1407 includes "only those who are named as such in the
record and who are properly served with process or enter their appearance." In re Library
Editions Of Children's Books, 299 F. Supp. 1139, 1142 (1969). In another case the Panel
ruled that in order to have standing to make a motion for transfer, the moving party
must be a party in an action which will be transferred if the motion is granted. In re
Western Liquid Asphalt, 303 F. Supp. 1053, 1053-54 (1969). Therefore a party cannot move
to have related cases transferred to the district in which his case is pending.
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conducted by the Panel to determine whether transfer will be made. 4 7 Section
1407 directs that the Panel shall order transfer to a single district when it is
determined that the actions share "one or more common questions of fact"
and that such transfer "will be for the convenience of parties and witnesses and
will promote the just and efficient conduct of such actions." 48
Where transfer is ordered the coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings
are conducted by a judge or judges assigned by the Panel. The Panel also
has the power to temporarily transfer judges from other federal jurisdictions
to assist in handling the proceedings.40 Upon completion of the coordinated or
consolidated pretrial proceedings, the actions are returned for trial to the district
from which they were transferred.50
Orders of the Panel issued prior to the order directing or denying transfersuch as an order setting a hearing-are reviewed in the court of appeals for
the district in which the hearing is to be held or has been held."' Orders of
the Panel directing transfer or orders issued subsequent to transfer are reviewed in the court of appeals for the transferee district.52 Such review may
be obtained only by extraordinary writ 53 filed in the appropriate court of appeals.5 However, "[t]here shall be no appeal or review of an order of the
panel denying a motion to transfer .. .
The Panel has adopted fifteen Rules of Procedure to govern the conduct
47. "The panel's order of transfer shall be based upon a record of such hearing . ..."
28 U.S.C. § 1407(c) (Supp. IV, 1969). All parties in all related actions are notified of the
time and place of the hearing, and at the hearing evidence may be presented by any party
in a case pending in any district which might be affected by the proceedings. Id. A "tagalong case" is one filed in a district court after the Panel has conducted hearings on the
main body of cases. Panel R. 1, 47 F.R.D. 377, 378 (1969). "When these cases become
known, the parties are ordered to show cause why the tag-along case should not be transferred without further hearing to the previously selected transferee court on the basis of
the prior hearing and for the reasons stated in the original opinion of the Panel." Robson,
Multi-District Litigation: § 1407 in Operation, 14 Antitrust Bull. 109, 112 (1969). See In re
Air Crash Disaster At the Greater Cincinnati Airport, 298 F. Supp. 355 (1969).
48.

28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (Supp. I,

1969).

49. 28 US.C. § 1407(b) (Supp. IV, 1969).
50. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (Supp. IV, 1969). See note 45 supra.
51. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(e) (Supp. IV, 1969).
52. Id.
53. See 28 US.C. § 1651 (1964). Such writ is used "to confine an inferior ... (judicial
body] to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so." Platt v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 376 US. 240,
245 (1964), quoting from Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 US. 21, 26 (1943). An extraordinary writ is "meant to be used only in exceptional cases where there is a dear abuse
of discretion or usurpation of judicial power." University Nat'l Stockholders Protective
Comm., Inc. v. University Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 328 F2d 425, 426 (6th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 US. 933 (1964). The use of such writ is at the discretion of the court. Roche v.
Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 25 (1943).
54. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(e) (Supp. IV, 1969).
55. Id. (emphasis added).
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of its business. 56 In addition, the Coordinating Committee, whose activities
and recommendations resulted in enactment of section 1407, has prepared a
7
The Manual contains speManual For Complex And Multidistrict Litigation.5
cific recommendations, suggested local rules, sample forms, and materials "for
use in the pretrial and trial of complex and multidistrict litigation."5 8 The
Manual provides a practical approach to the housekeeping problems of judicial
administration in such cases. 9

IV. THE

EVOLUTION OF STANDARDS

By formulating 1407 in broad general terms, Congress left to the discretion

of the Panel the development of guidelines on a case-by-case basis.00 Therefore,
a careful examination of the statute, the Panel's Rules of Procedure, and the
Manual for Complex and Multidistrict Litigation leaves unanswered some major
questions. The first of these questions is: What standards are to be considered by the Panel in determining whether to grant or deny transfer? The
second question is: What criteria are to be used by the Panel in choosing the

district to which the cases will be transferred? 0 ' Finally: What are the powers
of the transferee court?

56. Rules of Procedure of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, 47 F.R.D. 377
(1969). These Rules replace the ten Provisional Rules adopted by the Panel at Its first
meeting on June 26, 1968. 44 F.R.D. 389 (1968). Section 1407(f) empowered the Panel to
"prescribe rules for the conduct of its business not inconsistent with Acts of Congress and
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." The Panel Rules of Procedure contain provisions
regarding: Rule 1. Definitions; Rule 2. Place of Keeping Records and Files; Rule 3. Admission to Practice Before Panel; Rule 4. Place and Manner of Filing of Papers; Rule 5.
Service of Papers Filed; Rule 6. Motion Practice; Rule 7. Form of Papers Filed; Rule 8.
Submission of Proof of Facts; Rule 9. Withdrawal of Exhibits; Rule 10. Failure to Comply with Rules; Rule 11. Show Cause Orders; Rule 12. Conditional Transfer Order; Rule
13. Hearings; Rule 14. Motion for Extensions of Time; Rule 15. Remand.
57. 1 J. Moore, Federal Practice pt. 2 (H. Fink & I. Hall 2d ed. 1969). Commerce
Clearing House, Inc. and West Publishing Co. have separately published the Manual
in booklet form.
58. Id. at 5. The authors of the Manual intended it to be used only as a flexible guide,
recognizing that "the suggested procedures are not suitable for every complex case; nor
are they the best that can be devised." Therefore it is designed to be continuously revised and supplemented "to reflect the rapidly changing nature of the problems and the
accumulation of new experience." Id. at 6-7. See 1968 Annual Report at 33, 83.
59. For a critique of the Manual see Comment, Observations on the Manual for Complex and Multidistrict Litigation, 68 Mich. L. Rev. 303 (1969).
60. "It is believed that a sound judicial discretion to select (1) the cases to be transferred and (2) the district to which they will be transferred is essential to assure just
results." S. Rep. No. 454 at 4. "The statutory critria [sic) are necessarily vague, as the
value of the procedure will ordinarily turn on various factual circumstances which make
inappropriate statutory classification." 7A J. Moore, supra note 57, at JC-632.
61. Some indication of the importance of these two questions to the practicing bar
can be seen in the following experience of one attorney before the Panel's predecessor,
the Coordinating Committee: "I . . . traveled, at considerable expense to my client, to
hearings where I found myself one of a courtroom full of lawyers, for the most part
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A. Criteria for Transfer
The prerequisite for transfer of cases under 1407 is that there be "one or
more common questions of fact.":62 Beyond this basic requirement, the only
statutory criteria for transfer are "the convenience of parties and witnesses
and .. . the just and efficient conduct" of the proceedings.a Therefore, in
order to perceive some indication of the specific factors weighed by the Panel
in deciding whether or not to transfer the proceedings it is necessary to examine the opinions of the Panel.6
1. One or More Common Questions of Fact
The Panel has held the statutory requirement of at least one common factual
issue to be the "initial criteria" for transfer.05 However, the degree of satisfaction required under this standard varies according to the nature of the actions
involved. The Panel is quick to find the necessary common factual questions
where the cases arise from an air crash disaster and has held that "[t]here
is no doubt that this type of litigation arising out of a single disaster involves
common questions of fact .... The Panel has also ruled that "[i]t is...
*66

strangers to one another, mandated to organize themselves, to elect a lead spokesman and
to divide perhaps, at most, one hour of argument among themselves. Since my client was
not one of the larger or most frequently named defendants in those cases, and its position
was not in all respects common with those of such defendants, I was obliged to choose
between silence and five minutes of what I felt was a futile effort to focus the panel's
attention on what my client deemed most important to its interests." Seeley, Procedures
For Coordinated Multi-District Litigation: A Nineteenth Century Mlind Views With Alarm,
14 Antitrust Bull. 91, 92-93 (1969). Such a situation has not been precluded by the
Panel's Rules of Procedure which provide that counsel for each side "are to meet separately prior to the hearing for the purpose of organizing their arguments" and that "one
hour will be allotted for matters being considered for the first time .

. . ."

Panel R. 13,

47 F.R.D. 377, 381 (1969). With such a premium on time it is essential that the practicing attorney have some understanding of the process of evaluation and the standards
of consideration used by the Panel if he is to effectively represent the interests of his
client.
62. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (Supp. IV, 1969).
63. Id. See text accompanying note 48 supra.
64. Opinions of the Panel are published in the Federal Supplement.
65. In re Air Crash Disaster At the Greater Cincinnati Airport, 298 F. Supp. 353, 354
(1968). This case involved fourteen actions filed in six districts. General Dynamics Corp,
the manufacturer of the fateful aircraft, was a defendant in only one of the actions and
urged that its case not be transferred for consolidated pretrial proceedings. It argued that
"1407 is inappropriate where there is a single claim against a single defendant." The Panel
rejected this argument and held that "1407 is not operative only where there is multidistrict litigation involving common plaintiffs or defendants. The initial criteria is whether
the litigation involves 'one or more common questions of fact.' 28 US.C. § 1407(a)." Id.
See In re Photocopy Paper, 305 F. Supp. 60, 61 (1969); In re Gypsum Wallboard, 303
F. Supp. 510, 911 (1969).
66. In re Air Crash Disaster At Falls City, Neb., 298 F. Supp. 1323, 1324 (1969). Although common questions of fact were found to exist, the Panel declined to order transfer
on other grounds.
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undeniable that common questions of fact are present"07 where the actions
are based on a nationwide conspiracy to fix prices and credit in violation of
the Sherman Act. 68 On the other hand, where there are relatively few cases
involved, a party seeking to justify transfer "bears a strong burden" to show
not only that there are common questions of fact, but also that these questions
are of a "complex" nature. 69
However, in situations where the common questions of fact are out-numbered
and out-weighed by the uncommon factual issues, transfer may still be ordered.
Under 1407(a) those actions having limited commonality may be separated
from the mass of litigation and returned by the Panel to the transferor district
at the point when the consolidated proceedings in the transferee district are no
longer applicable to the particular case.70
Finally, it is the facts themselves which must be common to the cases and
not the legal theory in which those facts will play a part. Different legal theories
will not bar transfer where there is commonality of factual issues. 71
67. In re Gypsum Wallboard, 297 F. Supp. 1350, 1351 (1969).

68. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964).
69. In re Scotch Whiskey, 299 F. Supp. 543, 544 (1969). See In re Photocopy Paper,
305 F. Supp. 60, 62 (1969); In re IBM 302 F. Supp. 796, 799 (1969). The legislative
history of 1407 provides that: "If only one question of fact is common to two or three
cases pending in different districts there probably will be no order for transfer, since It
is doubtful that transfer would enhance the convenience of parties and witnesses, or promote judicial efficiency. It is possible, however, that a few exceptional cases may share
unusually complex questions of fact, or that many complex cases may share a few questions
of fact. In either of these instances substantial benefit may accrue to courts and litigants
through consolidated or coordinated pretrial proceedings." S. Rep. No. 454 at 4-5. For
an example of an instance where the necessary unusual complexity was found to exist
see In re IBM, supra. For examples of the absence of the required degree of complexity
see In re Scotch Whiskey, supra and In re Photocopy Paper, supra.

70. See In re IBM, 302 F. Supp. 796, 799 (1969).
71. In re Antibiotic Drugs, 299 F. Supp. 1403, 1406 (1969). In this antitrust litigation,
transfer and consolidation was opposed on the grounds that some of the actions involved
antibiotic drugs for human consumption, while others involved drugs for use in animal
feed. The Panel found the common factual issue in the conspiracy itself. Id. See In re
Gypsum Wallboard, 303 F. Supp. 510, 511 (1969); In re Concrete Pipe, 303 F. Supp. 507,
508-09 (1969); In re Air Crash Disaster At the Greater Cincinnati Airport, 295 F. Supp.
51 (1968). Transfer was also opposed by one plaintiff who based his case on the theory
that prices would actually have been higher in the absence of the conspiracy. Plaintiffs In
the other cases based their argument on the more usual theory that prices would have
been lower. The Panel ruled that this difference did not affect the "[clommon question
of fact in respect to the conspiracy, economic conditions, and what prices would be in the
absence of conspiracy . . . .' In re Antibiotic Drugs, 295 F. Supp. 1402, 1404 (1968). See
In re Gypsum Wallboard, 303 F. Supp. 510, 511 (1969); In re Antibiotic Drugs, 299 F.
Supp. 1403, 1406 (1969). Nor do conflicting class action claims bar transfer if there are
common facts underlying the claims. In re Antibiotic Drugs, 299 F. Supp. 1403, 1406
(1969). See also notes 98-101 infra and accompanying text.
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2. Convenience of Parties and Witnesses
The Panel has made it clear that in applying the standard of convenience,
the multidistrict litigation will be viewed as a whole. Inconvenience to an individual party will not prevent transfer of his case, where consolidation would
be generally convenient for all the parties and witnesses in all the cases. 2 The
Panel has recognized that "[s]ome inconvenience to someone is inevitable when
cases are transferred, ' 73 and has held the extra expense for counsel's travel
to the transferee district to be "offset by the savings from . . . coordinated or
consolidated pretrial proceedings ....
Nor does any possible inconvenience to witnesses present a serious obstacle
to transfer. The Panel has ruled that depositions will be taken at locations
which are convenient to the witnesses and, if necessary, deposition judges will
be appointed
to supervise the taking of depositions outside the transferee
75
district.
3. The just and Efficient Conduct of Such Actions
Section 1407 was designed primarily as a device to achieve greater efficiency
in judicial management. 76 However, lest the interest of the parties be totally
sacrificed for a saving in judicial time and effort, the goal of efficiency is
tempered by the requirement that the transfer and consolidation must result
in "just" as well as "efficient" proceedings. 77 As might be expected, the Panel
has considered such factors as the size of the damage claims,78 the extent of
progress already made in pretrial proceedings underway in the various distriCtS,7 9 and the likelihood of inconsistent judicial treatment of identical issues.80

Ordinarily the factors affecting the just and efficient conduct of the pro72. In re IBMi 302 F. Supp. 796, 799 (1969); In re Antibiotic Drugs, 299 F. Supp.
1403, 1405 (1969); In re Library Editions Of Children's Books, 297 F. Supp. 385, 385-86

(1968).
73. In re IBM, 302 F. Supp. 796, 799 (1969).
74. In re Concrete Pipe, 303 F. Supp. 507, 509 (1969); In re Antibiotic Drugs, 295 F.
Supp. 1402, 1404 (1968).
75. In re IBM, 302 F. Supp. 796, 799 (1969). This avoids conflict with Rule 4S(d)(2)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which limits the distance a witness can be required to travel for the taking of his deposition.
76. S. Rep. No. 454 at 2; Hearings on S. 159 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in
judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 2, at
115 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Hearings in S. 159J. Cf. Clickenhaus v. Lytton Financial
Corp., 205 F. Supp. 102, 105 (D. Del. 1962); Cinema Amusements, Inc. v. Loews, Inc.,
85 F. Supp. 319, 326 (D. Del. 1949).
77. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (Supp. IV, 1969).
78. E.g., In re Grain Shipments, 300 F. Supp. 1402, 1404 (1969).
79. E.g., In re Air Crash Disaster At Falls City, Neb., 298 F. Supp. 1323, 1324 (1969).
80. E.g., In re Fourth Class Postage Regulations, 298 F. Supp. 1326, 1327 (1969). For
additionalfactors see In re Library Editions Of Children's Books, 299 F. Supp. 1139, 1143

(1969).
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ceedings will depend on the various circumstances of the particular cases. Therefore a complete list or classification of such factors would be neither practical
nor desirable. 8' As the Panel has said: "[E] ach application must be considered
upon its merits and in relation to particular problems in the various pending
suits which are the
subject of the motion for consolidation or coordinated pretrial proceedings. 82
B. Criteria for Determining the Transferee District
Section 1407 allows transfer to any district.8 3 The Panel is without statutory
restrictions on its choice and similarly without criteria for its determination. 4
However, since the primary purpose of 1407 is judicial efficiency it is not
surprising that factors relating to this goal predominate in the Panel's choice
of transferee district. In this regard the Panel considers the degree of progress
achieved in districts where pretrial proceedings have already begun to be "an
important part in our selection of the transferee court and the assignee judge."85
The Panel will ordinarily designate the district with the most advanced discovery program, intending that all previous discovery be made available to
transferred parties.8 6 These parties will, if necessary, be permitted
to supplement
87
that portion of the discovery program already completed.
Similarly, the Panel has given consideration to the number of related cases
filed in proposed transferee districts,83 the location of relevant documents,
records, and parties,8 9 the situs of the cause of action, 0 and even the amount
of damages sought in each district.91 No one of these elements is controlling
and they all go to make up "the litigation's [geographic] center of gray81. See 7A J. Moore, supra note 57, at JC-632.
82.
83.

In re Air Crash Disaster At Falls City, Neb., 298 F. Supp. 1323, 1324 (1969).
28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (Supp. IV, 1969).

84. However, the legislative history of 1407 does state that "a number of factors should
be weighed in the selection of a transferee district: the state of its docket, the availability
of counsel, sufficient courtroom facilities, etc." S. Rep. No. 454 at 5; H.R. Rep. No. 1130,
in 2 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 1898, 1901 (1968). See 7A J. Moore, supra note 57, at
JC-632.
85. In re Gypsum Wallboard, 303 F. Supp. 510, 511 (1969). See In re Concrete Pipe,
303 F. Supp. 507, 508 (1969); In re Fourth Class Postage Regulations, 298 F. Supp.
1326, 1328 (1969); In re Plumbing Fixture Cases, 295 F. Supp. 33, 34 (1968).
86. In re Gypsum Wallboard, 303 F. Supp. 510, 511 (1969).
87. Id.
88. E.g., In re Antibiotic Drugs, 295 F. Supp. 1402, 1403 (1968); In re Protection
Devices & Equip., 295 F. Supp. 39, 40 (1968).
89. E.g., In re IBM, 302 F. Supp. 796, 800 (1969); In re Library Editions Of Children's
Books, 297 F. Supp. 385, 387 (1968).

90. E.g., In re Air Crash Disaster At the Greater Cincinnati Airport, 298 F. Supp.
353, 354 (1969); In re Air Crash Disaster At Ardmore, Okla., 295 F. Supp. 45, 46 (1968).
91. In re Admission Tickets, 302 F. Supp. 1339, 1341 (1969).
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ity .... . 9 2 The Panel gives serious consideration to a "geographically
central
93
forum," particularly where the litigation is "coast-to-coast.
In selecting a district for consolidation, just as in the basic determination
of whether or not to transfer, the convenience of parties and witnesses is a
factor to be considered, but is not controlling. The Panel will not allow added
expense and inconvenience to an individual party to defeat transfer of his
case where consolidation of the pretrial proceedings "as a whole" would be
"just and efficient."94
Nor will transfer be barred by calendar congestion in the proposed transferee district. The Panel will avoid the problem of delay and further congestion
by exercising its power under 1407(b)gs to transfer a judge from another dis-

trict to handle the proceedings.9 6

C. Powers of the Transferee Court
Section 1407(b) provides that the transferee judge conducting the consolidated or coordinated pretrial proceedings "may exercise the powers of a
district judge in any district .... ,,97 This simple precept fails to solve problems
arising from a conflict in the exercise of powers by the transferee and transferor courts. In re Plumbing Fixtures Cases 8 raised such a question with regard
to class action determinations. A plaintiff in one of the cases, while agreeing
to the transfer of other pretrial issues, requested that all class action questions
be separated and reserved for determination by the transferor court. 0 The
Panel denied the request.10

A lengthy majority opinion held that a single

claim for relief cannot be subject to the control of two different district courts
at the same time. Therefore, the Panel cannot separate the pretrial issues in
92. In re Library Editions Of Children's Books, 297 F. Supp. 385, 387 (1968). See In
re Fourth Class Postage Regulations, 298 F. Supp. 1326, 1328 (1969); Robson, MultiDistrict Litigation: § 1407 In Operation, 14 Antitrust Bull. 109, 114-15 (1969).
93. In re Library Editions Of Children's Books, 297 F. Supp. 385, 387 (1968).
94. See, e.g., In re Antibiotic Drugs, 303 F. Supp. 1056, 1057 (1969); In re Library
Editions Of Children's Books, 297 F. Supp. 385, 386 (1968).
95. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(b) (Supp. IV, 1969). See text accompanying note 49 supra.
96. E.g., In re Library Editions Of Children's Books, 297 F. Supp. 385, 387 (1968).
97. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(b) (Supp. IV, 1969) (emphasis added). In the legislative hearings
on 1407, it was stated that these powers include "the usual powers provided by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including authority to render summary judgment, to
control and limit pre-trial proceedings, and to impose sanctions for failure to make discovery or comply with pre-trial orders." In re Plumbing Fixture Cases, 298 F. Supp. 484,
499 (1968).
98. 298 F. Supp. 484 (1968).
99. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1) requires that: "As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a class action, the court shall determine by order
whether it is to be so maintained."
100. 298 F. Supp. at 488.
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a claim, designating some for the transferee court and others for the transferor court. 01' The Panel went on to state that:
[A] transfer under Section 1407 is a change of venue for pretrial purposes.
On change of venue . . . the jurisdiction and powers of the transferee court

are coextensive with that of the transferor court; ... the transferee court may make
any order to render any judgment that might have been rendered by the transferor
court in the absence of transfer; . . . after an order changing venue the jurisdiction
of the transferor court ceases; and . . . thereafter the transferor court can issue no

further orders, and any steps taken by it are of no effect. These principles are
applicable to a transfer under Section 1407 from the time of entry of the order of
transfer until the time of entry of an order of remand.10 2
The Panel held it to be within the power of the transferee court "to modify,
expand, or vacate" discovery orders which had been issued by the transferor
03
court.
Nor may the Panel "require completion of discovery underway, discovery
as the parties have agreed to, or which has been ordered by the transferor
court . . . ,,104 Once transfer has been made the treatment of the cases and
the conduct of the pretrial proceedings is completely at the discretion of the
transferee judge.105 The Panel is without power "to direct the transferee
judge
1 00
in the exercise of his powers and discretion in pretrial proceedings.'
Withheld, however, from the transferee court and reserved to the Panel is
the power to remand each case to its transferor court "at or before the conclusion" of the pretrial proceedings. 10 7 Also reserved to the Panel is authority
to "separate any claim, cross-claim, counter-claim, or third-party claim and
remand any of such claims before the remainder of the action is remanded." 08
101. Id. at 495. See In re Air Crash Disaster At the Greater Cincinnati Airport, 298
F. Supp. 353, 354 (1968) where the Panel rejected a request to withhold from transfer
the issue of damages to allow determination of this issue by the transferor court prior to
the determination of liability. See also In re Antibiotic Drugs, 299 F. Supp. 1403, 1405,
1406 (1969); In re Antibiotic Drugs, 295 F. Supp. 1402, 1404 (1968).
102. 298 F. Supp. at 495-96 (citations omitted). See also In re Gypsum Wallboard,
302 F. Supp. 794 (1969).
103. 298 F. Supp. at 489. The minority opinion was that, while the transferee court
had jurisdiction to determine class action questions, this jurisdiction existed only in the
absence of a motion on the subject pending in the transferor court. Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(c)(1) provides that a class action determination "may be conditional, and may be
altered or amended before the decision on the merits." It is therefore possible that a
determination by the transferor court may, after transfer, be vacated by the transferee court
and then be reinstated by the transferor court after remand. See In re Plumbing Fixture
Cases, 298 F. Supp. 484, 494 (1968). Only the principles of comity would prevent such a
situation from arising.
104. In re Plumbing Fixture Cases, 298 F. Supp. 484, 489 (1968).
105. Id.; see In re Plumbing Fixture Cases, 295 F. Supp. 33, 34 (1968).
106. In re Plumbing Fixture Cases, 298 F. Supp. 484, 489 (1968).
107. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (Supp. IV, 1969).
108. Id.; In re Plumbing Fixture Cases, 298 F. Supp. 484, 489 (1968).
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V. CONCLUSION

Congress envisioned 1407 as having application not only in multidistrict
antitrust actions such as the electrical cases, but also in cases arising out of aircraft disasters, patent and trademark disputes, products liability cases, securities violations, surety bond actions, and air and water pollution litigation.'0
During its first two years, 1407 has already been widely applied in many of
these areas. 10
Despite some opposition,"' 1407 has generally been favorably received and
commented upon by the profession. 1 2 However, the acceptance and application
of new judicial techniques has always been a slow and careful process t1 3 and
it can be said that the Panel is just emerging from its "early and formative
stages.""14 During these initial stages it was essential that the Panel not be
unduly restricted in its attempts to strike the necessary balance between justice
and efficiency. The proper approach was a flexible one. The general terms in
which the standards of 1407 are formulated provided this necessary flexibility.
The Panel, in applying the section, has not been hindered by an "excessive
reverence for the past and fear of change .... "15 The opinions dearly show
that 1407 will not be held in reserve awaiting the development of a mass of
litigation having the extreme dimensions and scope of the electrical cases, but
rather, the section will be liberally applied in the interest of increased judicial
efficiency.
As an ever larger body of case law evolves in the form of Panel opinions,
1407 standards will become more clearly defined and additional guidelines will
emerge. The growing body of Panel case law must therefore be continually
109. 114 Cong. Rec. H1584 (daily ed. March 4, 1968); Hearings on S. 3815 Before
the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the

Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1966); Hearings on S. 915 at 325-26.
110. See In re Scotch Whiskey, 299 F. Supp. 543, 544 n.3 (1969); Hearings on S. 961
Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 2, at 268-73 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Hearings
on S. 961].
111. E.g., Statement and testimony of Philip Price, Hearings on S. 159 at 103-04;
Seeley, supra note 61.
112. See, e.g., Emmerglick, Procedures In Complex And Multi-District Litigation, 37
Antitrust LJ. 800 (1968); McLachlan, The Multidistrict Litigation Act: The Demise of
Venue, 49 Chi. B. Record 367 (1968); Neal, Multi-District Coordination-The Antecedents of
§ 1407, 14 Antitrust Bull. 99 (1969); Note, The Problem of Venue in Multiple District
Litigation, 41 Notre Dame Law. 507, 525-26 (1966); Comment, Consolidation of Pretrial
Proceedings Under Proposed Section 1407 of the Judicial Code; Unanswered Questions
Of Transfer and Review, 33 U. Chi. L. Rev. 558, 573, 575 (1963).
113. This has been deemed necessary to insure that in improving one element of the
legal establishment, another is not injured or destroyed. See B. Botein & M. Gordon, The
Trial Of The Future: Challenge to the Law 23 (1965).
114. Hearings on S. 961 at 267.
115. Tydings, Court Of The Future, 13 St. Louis U.L. J. 601 (1969).
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reviewed and analyzed if an understanding of the uses and limitations of 1407
is to be achieved. Such an understanding is essential if it is to be used with
any degree of skill as one of a growing number of tools for the achievement of
0
that
process based on the 11principle
a just and efficient litigation process" O-a
7
"litigation is the pursuit of practical ends, not a game of chess."
116. For example, it has been held that § 1407 is merely a preliminary step in streamlining litigation and is not incompatible with § 1404(a) transfer. The two sections can
and often should be used in conjunction. See In re Grain Shipments, 300 F. Supp. 1402,
1404 (1969); In re Mid-Air Collision Near Hendersonville, N.C., 297 F. Supp. 1039, 1040
(1969); 1 J. Moore, supra note 57, pt. 1, § 5.32 [21, [4], at 96, 97. For a recent proposal
would extend
which would further streamline litigation see Hearings on S. 961. The bill
federal jurisdiction and a uniform federal law to all cases arising from aviation and space
activities. This would bring greater efficiency to litigation resulting from air crash disasters,
See Comment, 64 Nw. U.L. Rev. 188 (1969), supra note 28.
117. Indianapolis v. Chase Nat'1 Bank, 314 U.S. 63, 69 (1941).

